12월 경 소비가 살아날 것으로 기대했는데
2013/12/12 - [특별한 이야기] - 소비가 살아나는가?
생각만큼 빠르게 올라와주지 않는 모습입니다.
소비자 물가도 그렇고, 생산자 물가도 그렇고...별롭니다.
더불어 2월 소비자 심리지수도 전월 109에 비해 108로 1포인트 낮아졌습니다. 언제까지 기다려야 될지...일단은 경제 3개년 계획으로 박차를 가하고 있는 정부정책을 주목해야 하구요. 지표로는 기업의 투자가 증가하는가를 꼭 체크해야 될 듯 합니다. 경기 회복의 선순환 고리 중 하나인 기업투자에서 흐름이 막혔기 때문입니다.
투자 -> 가계소득 증가 -> 소비 증가 -> 물가 상승
기업의 투자지표인 설비투자와 건설투자 실질증감률입니다. 작년 4분기에 설비투자 증감율이 상당히 높았음을 알 수 있죠.. 아직은 'Ongoing'인 것이네요. 물고기를 기다리는 낚시꾼의 심정입니다^^ 기다려 봐야죠.
11월 한국은행은 기준금리를 다시 동결했다. 전체적인 그림으로는 경기가 회복세로 돌아섬을 나타냄에도 불구하고 가계 및 내수기업의 부진때문이라고 한다. 현재 한국의 경기는 어떨까? 정부에서는 회복세로 가고 있다고 하지만 체감경기는 12월 한파처럼 추운것이 현실이다.
우선 경기를 나타내는 실질 GDP를 보자.
실질 GDP 변동
체감경기와 달리 놀랍게도 국내총생산은 전년 대비 상승을 가리키고 있다.
GDP가 증가하는 이유는 가계소비증가, 기업투자증가, 정부지출증가, (수출-수입)의 증가로 나눌 수 있는데- 우선 기업 투자 및 수출 - 수입의 증가를 보자.
제조업 지수를 살펴보니 50을 막 넘어갔다...기업의 경기는 확장국면으로 접어들었다는 것이다...이상해서 자료를 자세히 보니
...수출이 증가했다고 한다. 수출이 기업의 경기를 이끌고 있는 것이다. 오히려 고용은 소폭감소했다고 한다. 이는 2013년 10월까지의 정보이다.
민간소비 역시 늘었다고 한다. 국민들이 느끼는 체감경기와는 거리가 있어 보인다;;
고용률도 증가...했다고 한다. 9월까지의 내용이니까 위 HSBC얘기와 불일치한다고 결론 내릴 수는 없다.
그럼 왜 체감경기는 추운 것일까...물가를 보니 의문이 어느정도 풀린다.
물가는 경기와 비례한다. 수요가 많아지니 물건의 가격도 오르기 때문이다...생산자물가는 오름세로 돌아선듯 보이지만(아직 확실치는 않다) 소비자 물가는 10월까지 계속 하락세임이 확인된다.
현재 한국의 경기는 회복세로 돌아서고 있다는 것은 분명해보인다. 하지만 민간소비가 살아나지 않고있다. 소비가 턴어라운드 하는 순간이 한국경제의 진정한 회복기일 것이다. 이 지표를 당분간 주목해 보자.
AMY BERNSTEIN: Welcome to the HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business Review. I’m Amy Bernstein, and I’m here today with Clayton Christensen, professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, and co-author of Consultants on the Cusp of Disruption, a feature in the October issue of HBR. Joining us on the phone is Dominic Barton, Global Managing Director of McKinsey and Company. Dom, Clay, thanks for being here today.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Delighted to be with you
DOMINIC BARTON: Great to be here.
AMY BERNSTEIN: Clay, you’ve documented the phenomenon of disruption for years across numerous industries, probably most famously in the steel business. What are you seeing in the world of general management consulting?
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Well, I will say that I see disruption occurring there, but everybody needs to know that we’re not pointing the finger at everyone else, that the process of disruption is occurring against the Harvard Business School itself. So this is not just a targeted shot at any one. But you do see it happen, and disruption always occurs in ways that it emerges in parts of the market where you wouldn’t even think to ask.
And in this case, what disrupts any business is somebody takes a piece of business that is not attractive to the leaders, and because it’s not attractive in the pursuit of profit, they go to bigger and bigger, and nicer and nicer pieces of business. And then the disruptor starts at the bottom and moves up. And what’s attractive in the consulting business is big clients who have big problems. And the more they can have more of those kinds of clients, the more profitable they become.
And what they leave behind are small pieces of business– small companies; tangible, immediate projects that they do and then you leave. And those are the kinds of disruptive innovators in consulting that are taking root. And then they move up, going after bigger and bigger pieces of business.
AMY BERNSTEIN: Does this differ in any way from what you saw in manufacturing, and what you see in other industries?
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. Really, disruption is a process. The theory itself is in evolution over time. So at the beginning, we thought that the vertical axis in the disruptive diagram was the quality of the product.
And then we realized that, no, that’s just what customers are more profitable versus less profitable. And when we understood that, just everything fell into place. So for example, if you think of the airline industry as being disrupted, what’s the vertical axis on that diagram? I mean, once you have economy and first class, how do you go up market from first class? It just doesn’t make sense.
But then we realized, oh my gosh, it’s the length of the route. Long routes are more profitable than short roots. And so the big majors are getting out of short routes, and turning that over to regional jet providers so that they can go into longer and longer international routes where the margins are. And once you understood that, it’s happening.
AMY BERNSTEIN: So that’s your point about bigger problems, bigger clients? That’s the top of the y-axis?
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: That’s exactly right.
AMY BERNSTEIN: Dom, when did you know the world of consulting was changing, and that McKinsey had to change, as well?
DOMINIC BARTON: Well, first of all, I think I’d say that the consulting has been changing. For the last, I think, 20 or so years, there have been changes. And I think what was, if you will, an inflection point was– for me, at least– was in 2009, when I took on this role, I had some work done, which we recommend. We typically have our clients do when a new CEO comes in– which was just, how’s the global context shifting? And it was a work called global forces, which are, what are some of the core shifts over the next 15 to 20 years as far as we can see out, recognizing that could be a difficult thing to do?
And to cut a long story short, that work kind of said to me that we are in a time for some significant change in the world, and why should we think that we’re immune to that? I try to see– Amy, as you know– two CEOs a day, and one of the things that always came through was technology’s moving five times faster than management. I don’t know whether to be paranoid or excited. I’m typically both, with sort of a comment– this shift towards Asia and Africa, resource scarcity. Just a lot of big issues, and it just made me think, well, maybe we better think about what is that we’re doing.
And so as a result of that, we’ve launched a kind of an internal strategy review, which basically was an 18 month process, again, where we took our own medicine, and spent a lot of time talking with our clients, and also with people we don’t work with– clients we would like to serve, but companies that we’ve never served, talking to people outside the industry, observers and so forth. And it suggested that, as Clay has written in the article, that change is afoot in many dimensions.
AMY BERNSTEIN: Can you talk a little bit about what you were hearing specifically from CEOs that made you think you needed to go back and challenge the orthodoxies of McKenzie?
DOMINIC BARTON: Yes, there were a number of things. I think one was, why does every issue or opportunity or problem take a project manager plus two associates three months to solve it? Surely, there are other ways, more efficient ways. Surely, sometimes we may just want data. If you guys had collected information on how hospitals work, and you had a large number of them, and looked at how often an operating table was used and so forth, and collected data like that, we may just want the data, not the people, if you will.
So there was a notion of be more flexible. What we really value is x versus y. Sometimes, you go into far too much analytical detail. We only need to go 60% of the way to be able to get it.
We value the judgment, not so much the analytics. And this obviously varied by situation and type of client. But there were a lot of questions on– or suggestions on– you could be a lot more flexible in terms of how you work with us– the type of people, the amount of time, and so forth.
AMY BERNSTEIN: Anything about this strike you, Clay?
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Actually, no. McKinsey is doing all of the right things. And yet, by doing the right things, it sets in place the process of disruption, which you then have to account for. And so the descriptions of the work that they’re doing– unbelievably foresighted work about complicated problems– is what we would call sustaining innovations. It’s hard to do, and that’s why they do it so well.
And then, when they take low-value adding activity, and outsource that to somebody, if you listen to the people in that company about what do they do next and next and next, they will try to do more and more high-value adding work relative to where they started out. And so the process is– he’s described it exactly right. And dealing with that is the big innovator’s dilemma.
AMY BERNSTEIN: So Dom, talk a little bit about McKinsey Solutions, if you would, if you could describe it. And tell us about the internal re-think that led to it.
DOMINIC BARTON: Sure. Well, as I mentioned, we did this– we called it a firm strategy review, which isn’t a very exciting name, but that was the 2010 effort we launched where, again, we talked to a whole range of clients and non-clients and third parties, if you will, and also alumni; and in that, a number of ideas for how we could work differently with clients, and what we work on or put forward. And one of them was actually an idea that had already been lurking in the background. It had come in in 2007, which was around taking data, if you will. And we sort of stumbled into it, and I’ll give an example.
One was around Chinese consumer insights. We found– when I was living in China, we couldn’t rely on a lot of the publicly available data, and what consumers were doing. So it just wasn’t reliable or it wasn’t accurate, so we started to develop our own. And we built a very large database of the Chinese consumer– the middle class consumer who’s changing at a very rapid rate, far more rapidly than we’ve ever seen before.
And I won’t bore you with all the detail of it, but we built that. And then what we found was that that database was something that actually clients wanted, and they wanted that– was the prime thing they wanted, as opposed to the McKinsey people around it, if you know what I mean. They said, we would actually like that data, and you’ve been collecting it, and we’ll pay for that. We don’t really need a team.
And so, that was one of the early McKinsey Solutions. There were some things in health care and a number of other areas. And we were experimenting with this, but the firm strategy review really kind of popped that out. And people said, boy, if you had that type of thing, we’d be very interested in that sort of information, and a new way of working with people, and so forth.
So that was the genesis of it. There had kind of been glimpses of it, or it was lurking in the organization. We weren’t really aware of what we had. It was brought more to life through this review.
And then, what I did on that one was put one of the most experienced senior people in the firm– actually, Michael Patsalos-Fox, who is a very close friend, and has been in the firm for 30 years. He used to run our Americas group. I had him lead our McKinsey Solutions.
And it was a bit of New Ventures Group, but McKinsey Solutions was a big part of it, because I knew he would stimulate it and he’d protect it, because one of the things– I’d be interested in Clay’s view– but when you try new things, it’s amazing the number of people and antibodies that are in the organization that try and kill it, because it’s different, and it’s why are we doing this? And we’re cannibalizing something, this isn’t right– all that sort of stuff.
So we needed a very strong leader to protect it, if you will, and nourish it. And he did. And he took that from kind of having– I guess there were three of them, to I think we now have 18. And it really was to help develop the model.
By the way, some of them have not worked. We’ve had to shut them down. But fortunately, the vast number of them are working, but it meant we had to change our people processes, right? A person who is running a McKinsey solution, which is more like a piece of software. So that’s sort of a bit of an overview.
AMY BERNSTEIN: It’s really interesting. And Clay’s been taking notes. I wonder what you think of what Dom’s been describing.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: So you’re doing everything right that I can imagine you would do. And as a result of that, I worry about you. My wife said that she describes me as the Jewish mother of business, in that it doesn’t matter everything that is going right, a Jewish mother always worries about what’s not going right.
So just by analogy, disruption occurred in the traditional department store business. In the early ’60s, there were over 300 department stores. There are now only eight remaining. Macy’s is the largest.
And they were disrupted by discount retailers like Walmart and Target and Kmart. And the way the traditional department stores made their money is they generated gross margins of 40%. They turned their inventory over three times a year. So they got 40% times 3 equals 120% return on capital invested in inventory every year. And that’s the way they measured things.
When the disruptive retailers came in, they generated gross margins of 20%, and they turned their inventory over 6 times a year. So 20% times 6 equals 120% return on capital invested in inventory. And so their profitability– the bottom line was the same, but the method by which they generated that result was different. And that was the killer.
And so, the challenge– which will be a perpetual challenge– is that imagine that McKinsey Solutions in fact becomes very profitable. And its bottom line is the same. The formula by which they generate the profitability will be different.
And so every day, somebody’s going to come in to senior management saying, that doesn’t make sense, because from their perspective, it doesn’t make sense. And I wish I could say from my studies that that will go away, but it’s just smart people in the core business trying to improve their profitability when they see resources being spent on something that, from their perspective, doesn’t make sense in their belief that they’re helping McKinsey [? treasury ?] to stop doing what disruption says you should do. And so it’s a long way of saying congratulations, and oh my gosh, be careful.
DOMINIC BARTON: I think that’s very good caution.
AMY BERNSTEIN: So Dom, how do you deal with those antibodies, the ones that you referred to, that Clay just described?
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: And they’re not bad antibodies.
DOMINIC BARTON: No.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Isn’t it they exist in the pursuit of profitability, but they’re antibodies nonetheless.
DOMINIC BARTON: Yeah. And also, I think it’s the– we don’t measure profitability like a department store in that sense where I know where it is. But it’s also tradition, right? It’s kind of we’re here to work in a particular way. We’re not a software house. I mean what is this? There’s that element that comes in, too.
One of the things I found, by the way, is history is just a good thing to look at in your own institution as to what’s worked and what hasn’t worked. And so one, believe it or not– this sounds very trite– was when we decided to move to Europe from the US in 1959. There was a huge debate about it. I think the partnership with split as to whether this was a good idea or not to do it.
Another incident that I looked at was when we established the Global Institute, right? This was a research body that was actually set up purposely to do nothing to do with client work, if you will. It was a micro view of macro issues so as to help advance the state of management. But it explicitly could have not a direct link to clients.
And I thank God every day that we’ve got that Institute up and running, but I know that there were so many people that tried to kill that thing for probably 8, 9 years in McKinsey. We’re not a think tank. Why are we wasting this money? How much are we paying these people? Blah, blah, blah.
So in a minor way, I’m fearful of the antibodies, because I’ve seen them, and I know that just from some of the things we did do, it took extraordinary leadership of some of the people in those places to kind of– they’ve probably got a lot of scars on their back to keep it going. So I think also relating that a bit to the organization is important, to say, you know, we actually have done some things differently.
One other story. I remember when we set up our operations practice. And I sometimes tease people about this in McKinsey. It was in, like, 1990, I think, is when that started. And this is how to do lean, and how to take costs out of procurement and so forth.
And there was quite a raging debate in McKinsey about going into this. And this isn’t, again, so much an innovation in how we work, but certainly wasn’t what we work, because we were seen as a strategy firm. And there were literally comments from some senior people in McKinsey, saying, we don’t want to do that type of work. That’s the work that knuckle-draggers do. I mean, really sort of rude statements were made to this group of partners that wanted to build this practice.
And again, I think there were some lessons learned from us, and why that practice was able to grow and be successful, even though they did things in quite different ways. We hired quite different people because of how they worked with the organization, what they stood for, how committed they were, all this sort of stuff. So those are things that are going on.
But I’m trying desperately to look as much as we can for wherever we’ve had some innovation, to try and drive it, and then kind of relate that to people and say, you know what, guys, I know this may seem strange to you in where it is, but we have done this. My only worry is I think that the speed and pace of change that we’re going to have to go through is going to go faster, and be bigger given these global forces. And that’s where I think Clay’s Jewish mother analogy is a good one. A bit paranoid about that.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Good for you. It is so exciting for me that I can’t stop jumping up and down here.
DOMINIC BARTON: One other thing, Amy. I was going to ask Clay this. To what extent do you think it’s normal– I’m struck by that some of the changes that you need to go through are actually lying around in the organization, but we don’t recognize them. So sometimes I wonder, maybe we don’t know what we have, if you know what I mean, that could help us.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: It’s a great observation. And what you can predict is that all of these things are bubbling up, and the organization itself will only identify those things that help the organization make more money in the way it’s structured to make money. And if there’s an idea that is proven at a small level, if it doesn’t fit the way the organization makes its money, it will either languish, or the organization will force it to conform itself to the way it makes money.
And so you have kind of two strikes against it in that it won’t come up to the top as an interesting idea if the organization can’t use it. And then b, even if they see it, they will make it conform itself to the way they make money. And to have something that truly is disruptive– and in this case, that deep understanding of how an area or an industry works– and use that in the context of McKinsey Solutions, which would be a disruption in disruption, is really hard to do. And if you could pull it off, my gosh, congratulations It just is really hard.
AMY BERNSTEIN: So this last question is to both of you. Where is the consulting industry going? What’s it going to look like in the next 10 to 20 years?
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: So I would bet that the existing leaders are going to be very vibrant 20 from now. And what they’re going to be increasingly known for and good at are the complicated problems for which there is no standard solution, and that there are projects that they can bill at higher prices for the world’s largest corporations.
AMY BERNSTEIN: So scale is an important factor in this complexity?
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: That’s right. That’s right. But on the other hand, there will be new companies that begin to be more and more important. And things that today seem out of the ordinary, unique, judgment-filled, a generation from now these will be standardized and outsource-able.
And it’s those that hit the outsourcing balls from McKinsey. They then start doing the low-value adding stuff. And then always the next question is– next year, how can we provide more and more value adding? And so, my bet is that 20 years from now, there will be people who today aren’t significant now start to become more and more significant.
And I think we can predict that. And it’s not because I wouldn’t ever attribute anything to McKinsey doing anything wrong. It’s doing things right that makes it hard.
AMY BERNSTEIN: So from where you sit, Dom, does that seem to be where the industry is going?
DOMINIC BARTON: Yeah, I think I would agree with Clay in the sense that I think there will be some new players. I’m biased. I’m determined that we’re going to be around and be leaders come hell or high water. But I think the way what we do and how we work will, I think, have changed pretty significantly.
And what I mean by that is if I– again, I go back to the kind of 70% of our work was in strategy, organization. Corporate finance is now 30%. I think we’re going to see at minimum that kind of a shift in terms of what we’re working on, but more importantly– as Clay said– is how we’re working on it.
And I think there will be any elements that can be disaggregated or outsourced will be out. And just to put a personal example on it, I remember one of the very first projects I did in McKinsey. This was in 1986, was a consumer goods project we were trying to figure out.
It was for a fast food company, and what the size of a particular meal should be– how many pieces of chicken should be in the order, and so forth. And I think it took six months to come up with a recommendation. I think with today’s technology– the search technology, the amount of data that’s available– I’d be surprised if that project wouldn’t take two weeks, if you will.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Absolutely.
DOMINIC BARTON: And the last thing that sort of goes through my mind is the work that Foster did on looking at the average lifetime of an S&P 500 company. And that one, if I had anything that’s over my office wall, that’s one– you know the average. I think the average lifetime was something like 90 years in the mid 1930s, and now it’s somewhere in the order of 18 years. And so I just think we have to have an assumption, a bit of a paranoid view of where we have no God given right to be here, so we better be spending some certain amount of resources or experiments going on.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: Amy, can I just add one other thing?
AMY BERNSTEIN: Of course.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: I think in many ways, the business of the Harvard Business School is to develop useful theories about management that can be used. And in many ways, McKinsey and its competitors in the consulting business are a distribution channel for our ideas. And if they aren’t vibrant, then we don’t have a way of getting our ideas to individual– individual people can read the Harvard Business Review. But for an idea to impact a company, we don’t have in academia a channel for that idea. It has to be people like McKinsey, who– I’m sure that you won’t be happy with my referring to you as a value adding reseller.
DOMINIC BARTON: No.
CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN: You take an idea, you value add it, and you send it. And it’s just very important to us that we have a great relationship with you. And if I were going to be a Jewish mother for the Harvard Business School, I would say, ladies and gentleman, have you noticed that McKinsey is pulling in-house the development of the next generation business ideas?
And when you see that happening, as the provider of the ideas, we got to say, we need to just look at the mirror in a very, very thoughtful way.
AMY BERNSTEIN: Well, thank you both. That was Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen and McKinsey Global Managing Director Dominick Barton. For more on this, go to hbr.org.
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